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Abstract. The convergence of the Neoplatonic/Neopythagorean approach with the 
Aristotelian organization of the sciences is one of the most interesting features that 
characterizes the two influential mathematical treatises on On Arithmetics (De institu-
tione arithmetica) and On Music (De institutione musica) by Severinus Boethius. Basing 
his reasoning on Nicomachus and Ptolemy, Boethius follows the philosophical tradi-
tion that had tried to reconcile Plato’s and Aristotle’s views. This attitude is examined 
in the present paper as regards Boethius’ response concerning the relation between 
numbers, ethics and aesthetics. His view emerges as coming out of a rather complex 
construction, which assigns the ethical scope of mathematics in indicating to the 
human mind how to correct the ratios that realize the best relationship in movements 
of the soul and the body. More precisely, its ethical aim is to correct the specific form 
of movement of human beings, that is their actions, exemplified in the way in which 
mathematical ratios represent the forms of government and musical ratios evoke and 
heal psychophysical affections. More complex, on the other hand, is the relationship 
between mathematics and beauty. In clear antithesis to the position taken by Augus-
tine on the beauty of the rhythmic patterns that better represent the beauty of unity, 
Boethius does not relate the mathematical ratios of the consonances to an estheti-
cal judgment by making use of the category of beauty. For him, the physical world is 
totally immersed in changes and movements, and this cannot but impede things from 
expressing the stable unity, which is required for contemplating the beautiful.
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Within the framework of his syncretic and ambitious intellectual 
endeavor, the Late Roman scholar Severinus Boethius (died 524/525) 
deserved great importance to mathematics, which, in agreement 
with Aristotle, was classified by him as one of the three theoretical 
sciences. Boethius divided mathematics into the four disciplines of 
arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy, named with the for-
tunate neologism quadrivium, the «four-fold path» to truth which 
allowed the mind to raise itself from the uncertainty of sense per-
ceptions to the certainty of intelligible truth. Boethius was also the 
author of two highly influential treatises on the first and the second 
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quadrivial disciplines, On Arithmetics (De institu-
tione arithmetica) and On Music (De institutione 
musica), which were grounded on the Neopla-
tonic/Neopythagorean approach to these sciences, 
largely mediated from his main sources, namely 
Nicomachus of Gerasa and Ptolemy. The conver-
gence of this Neoplatonic background with the 
Aristotelian view of mathematical sciences is one 
of the most interesting features of these treatises, 
and the present paper examines how it affected 
Boethius’s theory on the relation between num-
bers, ethics and esthetics. Such theory, by com-
bining the Platonic and Aristotelean legacies 
within the framework of the late Roman educa-
tional system, will transmit to the Western cul-
ture a renewed ideal of scientific knowledge, that 
the medieval scholars will then, in turn, integrate 
within the new Christian idea of wisdom1.
1. ARISTOTELIAN AND PLATONIC ATTITUDES 
TO THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE GOOD IN 
MATHEMATICS AND THEIR RECEPTION IN 
BOETHIUS
The ancient Greek concept of beauty was 
much broader than ours. “Beauty” included the 
“good” of thoughts and customs, and the com-
pound kalos k’agathos expressed an aesthetic and 
ethical ideal. Both Plato and Aristotle shared this 
view, though offered a different approach to these 
notions, particularly in the case of their applica-
1 This paper benefited from valuable comments of Stefa-
no Perfetti and from the English revision of Janet Dono-
van. I am very grateful to both of them and remain the 
only responsible for any error. Hereafter, all references 
to the Latin text of the De institutione arithmetica are 
from the edition by Oosthout, Schilling [1999] and to 
the Latin text of De institutione musica are from the edi-
tion by Friedlein [1867]. The two works are referred to 
in footnotes as Inst. arith. and Inst. mus. while in the text 
as On Arithmetics and On Music respectively. The refer-
ences to De consolatione philosophiae are from the edi-
tion by Moreschini [2005], referred to as Cons. Phil. For 
a detailed analysis on the origin of the quadrivium see 
Merlan [1975]: 88-95 and Guillaumin [1990].
tion to numbers, ratios and geometrical figures2. A 
relevant passage for the present enquiry is in Met-
aphysics 13.3, in the course of a long discussion 
contesting the Platonic and Pythagorean doctrine 
of mathematics. Here, Aristotle openly states that 
the sciences of numbers and figures are connected 
to the good and the beautiful. Yet, he remarks that 
these two notions are different, «for the former 
always implies conduct as its subject, while the 
beautiful is found also in motionless things». Sec-
ond, he states that mathematical sciences do not 
mention the good and the beautiful openly, but 
consider only their effects, and, leaving aside the 
good, he adds that «the chief forms of beauty are 
order and symmetry and definiteness, which the 
mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special 
degree» and that the beautiful, being the causative 
principle of order and definiteness, must be treat-
ed by these sciences «as in some sense a cause» 
(Metaphysics, 13, 1078a31-b5; transl. Ross [1924]).
Plato had also associated mathematics with the 
good and the beautiful, yet he had adduced differ-
ent reasons for their relationship to mathematical 
entities, and the difference between the two con-
cepts was not highlighted by him. The topic is 
discussed in almost all his dialogues. In the Phile-
bus, for instance, Socrates asserts that the highest 
beauty is that of straight lines and circles, for these 
«are not relatively beautiful, like other things, 
but eternally and absolutely beautiful» (Philebus, 
64d-65a.). Here, goodness and beauty are inti-
mately associated with measure and proportion 
(symmetria), which require a quantitative dimen-
sion. In the Republic, while discussing the musi-
cal education of the rulers, Socrates insists that 
mathematical harmonies should consider which 
numbers are concordant, which are not, and why 
they are so, and that this task «is useful if directed 
towards investigating the beautiful and the good, 
2 For an overview on this vast topic, further bibliographi-
cal references and details on mathematics, beauty and 
ethics in Plato and Aristotle see, for instance, Charles-
Saget [1982]; Burnyeat [2000]; Riegel [2014]; Men-
dell [2017]. On mathamatical science see also O’Meara 
[2005], for late antiquity, and Panti [2008] for the Middle 
Ages.
69Beauty, Ethics and Numbers in Boethius’ Quadrivial Treatises
but useless if otherwise pursued» (Republic, 7, 
531c. )3. Clearly, for Plato mathematical objects 
are beautiful and good in themselves in so far as 
they are eternal and unchangeable. Therefore, not-
withstanding Plato’s and Aristotle’s agreement on 
the aesthetical and ethical implications of math-
ematics, the two ancient philosophers provided 
different reasons for justifying this connection, 
depending in turn on their different conceptions 
of mathematical objects: for Plato, they are eter-
nally subsistent ideas, while for Aristotle, they are 
forms inherent to natural things and subject to 
change.
More importantly for the present study, Plato 
and Aristotle offered different explanation on how 
mathematical beauty and goodness are connected 
to the physical world and, from here, to num-
ber and figure. For Plato, the cosmos reflects the 
numerical order that, in the Timeus, is described 
as impressed by the Demiurge, who looked at 
ideal numbers to structure the soul of the world. 
Consequently, beauty and goodness pertain to 
natural things in as much as they reflect the eter-
nal numerical ratios, in the likeness of which 
all things and beings are shaped. These ratios, in 
turn, correspond to «the non-sensible concords 
in the divine attunement» of the cosmos. This last 
feature is exemplified in musical intervals, name-
ly in how those which sound “good” to the ears, 
i.e.4 the consonances, correspond to simple math-
ematical ratios, the same as those that shape the 
soul of the world5. In the Aristotelian view, on the 
other hand, when the mind thinks about numbers, 
geometrical figures and similar “forms”, or catego-
ries of substances, it separates them from refer-
ence to natural things. Therefore, to grasp beauty 
and goodness in numbers means: first, to abstract 
them from their physical instantiation and, sec-
ond, to consider their properties as if they were 
actually separate. This mental attitude is specific 
also to those intermediate sciences between pure 
3 See also, for instance, Charles-Saget [1982]: 14 ff.
4 See Burnyeat [2000]: 53.
5 Among the many studies devoted to this topic in Plato’s 
philosophy, I have followed Burnyeat [2000].
mathematics and physics, such as optics or har-
monics, which do not deal with vision or sound 
in themselves, as physics does, or with lines and 
numbers in themselves, as mathematics does, but 
with lines and numbers as attributes of vision or 
sound respectively6.
Besides, mathematics has also a different collo-
cation in the Platonic and Aristotelian divisions of 
philosophy. In Metaphysics 11.7 Aristotle propos-
es a classification of the sciences that reserves an 
independent collocation to mathematics, assigned 
to the domain of the theoretical sciences together 
with, but separated from, physics and from first 
philosophy, or metaphysics, as we now call it. 
Mathematical sciences deal with the study of the 
“forms” mentally separated from matter, while 
physics accounts for material things subject to 
change and movement. For Plato, on the contrary, 
the rather imperfect knowledge that human beings 
can attain of mutable things can be reached only 
by means of the very mathematical sciences. These 
are the disciplines presented in the Republic as 
those which bring the mind to the higher realm of 
dialectic and offer the access to what participates 
of number but is not number itself, i.e. the natu-
ral entities. The educational path, consequently, 
starts with abstract calculus, then continues with 
geometry and solid geometry, i.e. the sciences of 
immutable forms, to astronomy, the science of 
perfect movement, up to harmonics, the mathe-
matical ratios governing the universe (Republic, 7, 
522c-531d, 537c-d).
These divergent yet fundamental and long-
lasting ideas on mathematics and on its relation 
to aesthetics and ethics formed the basis of all 
subsequent intellectual approaches to the same 
6 Metaphysics, 13, 3, 1077b23-78a23, transl. Ross [1924]: 
«For just as the universal propositions of mathematics 
deal not with objects which exist separately, […] but with 
magnitudes and numbers, […] the mathematical scienc-
es will not for that reason be sciences of sensibles – nor, 
on the other hand, of other things separate from sen-
sibles. […] The same account may be given of harmon-
ics and optics; for neither considers its objects qua  sight 
or  qua  voice, but  qua lines and numbers; but the latter 
are attributes proper to the former».
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topics, and, at the turn of the fifth century of the 
Christian era, Boethius was well familiar with the 
rich philosophical and scientific tradition, mostly 
Neoplatonic, which had tried to interpret and, to 
a certain extent, mingle these same approaches in 
the light of the higher task of reconciling the disa-
greements between Plato and Aristotle. Boethius 
inherited the same syncretic attitude. As Chad-
wick remarks, his literary and educational pro-
gram was «a faithful reflection of the assumptions 
and teaching practice of the contemporary Pla-
tonic schools of Athens and Alexandria», where 
«young students were introduced to arithme-
tic through Nicomachus of Gerasa, to harmony 
through Nicomachus and Ptolemy, to geometry 
through Euclid, to astronomy through Ptolemy’s 
Syntaxis (the “Almagest”); then the Organon of 
Aristotle to which Porphyry’s Isagoge is prefixed, 
[…] finally up to metaphysical questions such as 
evil and providence or the supreme God at the 
apex of Platonic theology» (Chadwick [1981]: 21 
ff.). Receptive of this unitary system of educa-
tion, Boethius was conscious of the demanding 
task that its first inspirers, above all the Pythago-
rean Nicomachus of Gerasa and Claudius Ptolemy, 
had undertaken to incorporate their mathematical 
investigations as starting steps of the whole intel-
lectual process. He inherited from them the same 
aspiration to make evident that «in mathematics 
lies the key to the rational organization of the uni-
verse» (Barker [1989]: 8).
For Boethius, however, the search for this key 
also passes through a further step: his ambitious 
plan of translating into Latin and expounding the 
authoritative texts of Aristotle and Plato, whose 
convergence – imperative for him – had to be 
carefully reconstructed and harmonized under the 
unity of a single philosophical wisdom7. Boethius, 
standing “on the shoulders” of those giants, added 
the educational system of the Roman culture, rep-
resented by Vitruvius and Cicero, to the revered 
7 See Boethius, Commentarium in librum Aristotelis Peri-
hermeneias secundae editionis, 2, Introduction, in Docu-
menta Catholica omnia at: www.documentacatholicaom-
nia.eu.
Greek tradition of thought, and opened the way to 
the new Christian search for wisdom, already pur-
sued by Augustine8. His mathematical treatises are 
the first products of this outstanding mission, and 
his theory of the beautiful and the good in math-
ematics was deeply affected by this search of this 
cultural and philosophical unity.
2. THE GOOD AND ETHICS IN BOETHIUS’S 
QUADRIVIAL TREATISES
In his prologue to On Arithmetics, in an elabo-
rate dedication to his father-in-law and mentor 
Symmachus, Boethius manifests his intention to 
fulfil his enquiry into the first of the matheseos 
disciplinae by using Nicomachus’ Introduction to 
Arithmetics. Following this source, he begins the 
subsequent proemium in the name of Pythago-
ras, whose methodological approach to the math-
ematical sciences was presented by Nicomachus 
as a convergence of Aristotelian logic and Pla-
tonic theology. Let us briefly summarize how 
Boethius explains Pythagoras’ approach. To begin 
with, Nicomachus had called the four mathemati-
cal disciplines of arithmetic, music, geometry 
and astronomy as «methods (methodoi)» for pro-
ceeding upwards towards higher knowledge, and 
Boethius, accordingly, refers to them as «a four-
fold path (quadrivium)», because through them 
«we bring a superior mind from the knowledge 
offered by the senses to the more certain things of 
the intellect»9. These sciences are therefore seen as 
four steps (gradus), which are ordered in the same 
sequence that Nicomachus had established: arith-
metic, music, geometry, astronomy. Only in this 
order, in fact, does the mind gradually rise from 
sense perception to the certainty of intelligible 
truth. Boethius intends to follow the same path, 
and to offer a complete presentation of the “four 
8 See Restani [2008] and [2004].
9 Inst. arith. 1,1 and Nicomachus, Introductio Arithmetica, 
1, 1.1. The critical edition of Boethius’s text by Oosthout-
Schilling [1999] gives references to all parallel passages. 
For Nicomachus as sources of Boethius’ On Music see 
Bower [1978].
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sisters”. It seems that he really fulfilled the task, 
though only his On Arithmetics and On Music 
have survived and are known to us10.
Let us come back to Pythagoras. For Boethi-
us, still in line with Nicomachus, Pythagoras is 
the true wise scholar who incarnates this cor-
rect methodological approach precisely because 
he moved from sense perception, and, having 
discovered the numerical ratios which structure 
natural things, realized that they were the same 
as those which bind together soul and body in 
human beings and in the cosmos; hence the turn 
from perceptions to the higher truths of the mind 
occurs through mathematics. But how did Pythag-
oras realize this? The answer, according to Nicom-
achus and, consequently, to Boethius, is found in 
the Aristotelian logic, and specifically in the doc-
trine of categories. This is made explicit by Boethi-
us in both On Arithmetics and On Music, which 
follow Nicomachus’ Introduction. In On music, for 
instance, Boethius asserts:
Pythagoras was the first to call the study of wisdom 
“philosophy”, which he held as knowledge and disci-
plinary study of what it is properly and truly said “to 
be” (esse). Moreover, he considered “to be” (esse) those 
things that neither increase by augmentation (inten-
sione), neither decrease by diminution (deminutione), 
neither are altered by any chance occurrences. These 
things are forms, magnitudes, qualities, relations and 
all the others which, considered in themselves, are 
immutable, but, joined to natural bodies (corporibus), 
suffer radical change and are altered in many ways 
because of their relationship with a changeable thing. 
(Inst. musica, II, 1; My transl. on the basis of Bower-
Palisca [1989]: 53)
This same sentence has an equivalent in On 
Arithmetics, and is a faithful translation from 
Nichomacus. For him, the «real» or «bodiless» 
things, which Boethius translates «to be (esse)», 
are exactly the unchanging objects of true knowl-
10 On the remarks by Cassiodorus about the quadrivial 
treatises of Boethius see, for instance, Chadwick [1981]: 
70.
edge discovered by Pythagoras11. These are mag-
nitudes, qualities, relations and so on; this means 
that they are not the Platonic forms or ideas of 
number or geometrical figures as such, but more 
specifically the «primordial forms of being», that 
is to say an intentional rielaboration in Neopy-
thagoric perspective of the Aristotelian categories 
that define the prime category: the substance12. 
These “categories” are the indispensable premise 
for selecting the one that pertains to mathemat-
ics, namely the quantity, divided by Aristotle into 
continuous quantity, or magnitude, and discrete 
quantity, or multitude: magnitude is equivalent to 
geometrical figures and is continuous with its con-
stitutive parts, as it is, for instance, in a tree or a 
stone; while multitude consists of many parts, as 
in a flock or a wood, and is equivalent to number 
(Categories, 6). Within this classification, the four 
disciplines reveal their order: arithmetic studies 
multitude, or number, in itself, music studies it 
in relation to something else (ad aliquid), geom-
etry studies immovable magnitude, and astronomy 
movable.
The topic of ethics in mathematical sciences 
is grounded on these premises. Apparently, mag-
nitude and multitude have nothing to do with the 
superior knowledge of the truth, and cannot intro-
duce to the good, because it is evident that these 
11 For a detailed analysis of these passages and discussion 
on the “real things” as forms in Nicomachus see Helmig 
[2007].
12 D’Onofrio [2001]: 22-25: «Una intenzionale rielabo-
razione in chiave neopitagorica dell’elenco delle categorie 
aristoteliche posteriori alla sostanza». The correspond-
ence of the «real things»/esse is fully given in On Arith-
metics, which follows verbatim Nicomachus’ Introduction. 
They are, in the same order given by Nicomachus: quali-
ties (qualitates), quantities (quantitates), configurations 
(formae which translates the Greek schematismi, namely 
geometrical figures), largeness (magnitudines), small-
ness (parvitates), equalities (aequalitates), relations (habi-
tudines), actualities (actus) dispositions (dispositiones) 
places (loca), times (tempora) ecc. The Aristotelian cat-
egories are: substance, quantity, quality (qualification), 
relation, place (where), time (when), being-in-a-position, 
having, doing, being-affected. The latter is missing from 
the Nicomachean/Boethian re-elaboration.
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two forms of the esse of quantity are not immuta-
ble or eternal themselves, being subject to change 
in natural things. Yet, if these esse are thought of 
as separate from bodies and things, they are, as 
Nicomachus and Boethius assert, «stable and 
unchangeable». This is precisely the nature of 
mathematical objects for Aristotle, as seen above, 
and this conception is eventually the key to under-
standing why magnitudes and multitudes are 
linked to morality. In their connection with natural 
things and beings, in fact, they convey the chang-
es and movements of all things and, more impor-
tantly, in the case of human beings they express 
their actions through the definiteness of numbers 
and figures. Actions are conscious movements of 
human beings, and, as Aristotle asserts in the pas-
sage from Metaphysics 13 mentioned at the begin-
ning of this paper, «the good pertains to actions 
alone». Hence, there is a link between human 
actions, magnitudes and multitudes. Boethius 
identifies such a link precisely in the notion of def-
initeness, and assumes that it pertains both to the 
good, which is always definite and lacking inde-
terminacy, and to the mathematical investigations, 
given that magnitudes and multitudes are forms of 
bodily definiteness13. Hence, mathematical investi-
gations have an ethical significance.
To develop this last argument Boethius is 
mainly guided by Ptolemy, who, in his Harmon-
ics, drew his classification and presentation of the 
mathematical disciplines from Aristotle’s Meta-
physics14. Ptolemy identifies harmony (harmonia) 
with a movement producing some «good» end, 
«such as good melody, good rhythm, good order 
and beauty», harmony being «the cause, which 
imposes the appropriate form on the underlying 
matter» (Ptolemy, Harmonics, III, 3; transl. Barker 
[1989]: 371). Goodness itself, therefore, falls under 
mathematical knowledge, and Boethius faithfully 
proclaims the same view:
13 For instance in Inst. mus., I, 3: «In quibus autem plural-
itas differentiam facit, ea necesse est in quadam numer-
ositate consistere».
14 On Ptolemy as sources of Boethius’ On Music see Panti 
[2017].
Great certainty is the profit which comes from this 
science [i.e. arithmetics] if we do not ignore the fact 
that the definite goodness (bonitas definita), which is 
the object of science and is always subject to imitation 
and perceptible (imitabilis et perceptibilis), is the first 
nature (prima natura), which perpetually remains in 
the honor of its substance. On the contrary, the ugli-
ness of evil is infinite (infinitum), not sustained by its 
foundations, but always modified by its nature. […] 
This will clearly appear if we understand that all the 
genera of dissimilarities (inaequalitatis species) grew 
from the similarity, which is their foundation (ab 
aequalitatis crevisse primordiis). (Inst. arith., I, 32, 
1-2; transl. adapted from Moreschini [2014]: 17-18)
The way in which arithmetics reveals and 
introduces the good is therefore to be found in 
how it makes the mind aware of what is stable in 
magnitude and multitude with reference to the 
peculiar movements of human beings, namely 
their actions. If these mathematical qualities are 
thought of as separate from human beings, they 
reveal the reason for their stability, i.e. the unity 
of «the first nature», which is the perfect equality 
to which they lean; if, on the other hand, they are 
thought of within human beings, these qualities, 
unstable as they are, may be reduced to equality 
by means of «imitation and perception», as the 
passage asserts. Therefore, the moral goal of math-
ematics is to induce such an imitation in what is 
deviated from its first nature. It is worth noting 
that while the insistence on the “definite” charac-
ter of goodness in Nicomachus marks the contrast 
between the divine One and the indefinite dyad, 
which for the Pythagoreans symbolizes the evil 
as the beginning of multiplicity, in Boethius the 
goodness of unity is more clearly the “model” to 
look at for harmonizing the dissimilitude, which is 
constitutive of natural reality.
Boethius offers two examples of how math-
ematical sciences are connected to ethics. One 
pertains to arithmetics, the other to music. Both 
of them are not included in Nicomachus’ tractate, 
but are inspired by Boethius’ other main source, 
namely Ptolemy’s Harmonics15. Ptolemy had 
15 See Panti [2017].
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asserted that harmonia is to be identified as cor-
responding neither to something natural, nor to 
God, «but, clearly, to reason, which falls between 
the other causes mentioned (God and Nature) 
and joins with them in producing the good» 
(Ptolemy, Harmonics, III, 3, 92.16-24; transl. 
Barker [1989]: 371-372). Reason, eventually, is the 
special movement of human minds and is strictly 
linked to their actions, because human actions 
are – or should be – rational. In line with these 
principles, in On Arithmetics Boethius extends the 
notion of action to the political guide of civil life, 
and compares arithmetic, harmonic and geomet-
ric means (medietates) to oligarchic, aristocratic 
and democratic systems of government respec-
tively:
And thus, the arithmetic mean is compared to a state 
ruled by a few, because a greater proportion is in its 
smaller terms. […] The harmonic mean is the state 
ruled by the best (optimates), because a greater pro-
portion is found in the greater terms. In the same 
fashion a geometrical mean is of a state that is demo-
cratic (popularis) and equalized. For it is composed of 
an equal proportion of all, both in its greater and in 
its smaller terms, and among all there is a parity of 
mediation that preserves in proportion an equal right 
(aequum ius). (Inst. arith., II, 45; my translation)
Boethius suggests that these means were 
known to Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle and that 
the central and highest of them is the harmonic 
(expressed by the proportion 3:4:6), the clos-
est to unity given that the ratio of the differences 
between the first and the middle and between 
the middle and the last is equal to the ratio of the 
extremes, namely (a-b):(b-c)=a:c. This, in fact, 
corresponds to the government of the aristocrats, 
a clear reference to the Roman senatorial class to 
which Boethius himself belonged16.
Yet, if the morality of mathematics were only 
a matter of comparison with human actions, it 
16 Moreschini [2014]: 21 refers to this passage as an 
obscure example, but Boethius’ goal is clear at the light 
of the moral character of arithmetics and of its link with 
human actions.
would not be such a fundamental issue. In On 
music, Boethius reveals more consistently and 
openly the ethical relevance of numbers, and par-
ticularly of mathematical ratios. Musical knowl-
edge, in fact, concerns numbers and proportions, 
which are the quantity/esse not only of sounds, but 
also of what links together the body and the soul 
of human beings and converges with their com-
position (animae et corporis status eisdem quoda-
mmodo proportionibus videatur esse compositus) 
(Inst. mus. I, 1, 186, 9-13). Therefore, as the ear is 
affected by sound or the eye by a visible form, in 
the same way the judgment of the mind is affected 
by numbers or by continuous quantity (Inst. mus. 
I, 32, 222, 14-18)17. The ratio of pitches is what 
the musicus studies by means of speculation, but 
Boethius separates music from the other disci-
plines of the quadrivium by assigning to it alone 
a clear influence on morality. He says that this 
happens precisely because humans are «harmonic 
beings». Here, the famous theme of the Platonic 
ethos of music is openly evoked:
There happen to be four mathematical disciplines, the 
other three share with music the task of searching for 
truth; but music is associated not only with specula-
tion but with morality as well. For nothing is more 
characteristic of human nature than to be soothed 
by pleasant modes or disturbed by their opposites. 
(Inst. mus. I, 1, 179, 20-180, 10; transl. Bower-Palisca 
[1989]: 2)18
In other words, while the other mathematical 
disciplines describe the way in which multitude 
and magnitude realize their best relations and 
indicate, consequently, how the same ratios are the 
best dispositions in natural things and in human 
actions (as in the abovementioned case of the 
best forms of government), music changes human 
nature, and affects directly the relations between 
the soul and the body. Music, in fact, is a thera-
py for curing the diseases of the mind and of the 
17 For the translation of these passages see Bower-Palisca 
[1989]: 49.
18 See also the passage from Ptolemy’s Harmonics quoted 
at above.
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body, as it re-introduces the right ratios in what is 
deprived of harmony; yet, music can also be per-
nicious, if it transmits the altered ratios that cause 
bodily disharmony and psychological alterations. 
In agreement with Plato, music is really a power-
ful instrument for ethics and politics19.
3. THE HIDDEN AESTHETICS OF NUMBERS
If we turn to the relation between mathemat-
ics and the beautiful in Boethius’ quadrivial trea-
tises, we will hardly find the same clear conception 
that relates mathematics to ethics. Differently from 
Augustine, who had developed in his dialogue On 
music a very detailed analysis of human perception 
of beauty as represented by rhythm, which, in turn, 
is the expression of numerical ratios20, Boethius 
never mentions the beautiful or the beauty in his 
mathematical treatises. What pleases the ears is 
named in various ways by him, such as consonance 
(consonantia), sweetness (dulcedo), agreement 
(concordia)21, pleasure and the relative adjectives, 
but never as beauty (pulchritudo) or beautiful (pul-
chrum). This is striking, mainly if compared with 
the Augustinian abundant and explicit references 
to beauty in number, rhythm and music. Augus-
tine’s aesthetics is clearly and openly grounded on 
numbers. For him, «the beautiful pleases through 
number» for a reason that Boethius would not but 
share: the analysis of our perception of the beauti-
ful in musical rhythm leads to ratios that are ulti-
mately rooted in equality22.
Augustine, however, was not the only source 
which Boethius might have looked at for associ-
ating numbers and beauty. Ptolemy, who, as seen 
above, is also an important source for the Boethi-
an conception of mathematical morality, openly 
19 Cf. Inst. mus., I, 1.
20 See Bettetini [1994]: 177-195.
21 For instance, Inst. mus., II, 10: «Pythagoras hoc modo 
repperit, qua proportione sibimet haec sonorum concor-
dia iungeretur»; ibid. I, 1: «verum etiam delectetur saepi-
us, si dulces coaptatique modi sint».
22 For a detailed analysis of this theme in Augustine see 
Bettetini [1994] and Hentschel [2011].
addressed the topic of beauty as an even higher 
task to which the harmonic investigation leads 
human beings. As has been rightly remarked, for 
Ptolemy «the task of harmonics is to explicate the 
mathematical foundations of systems whose beau-
ty and excellence is evident to the ear, not those 
of some other, purely theoretical constructions. 
It seeks, in fact, to show that it is on rationally 
coherent mathematical patterns of order that the 
perceived beauty of real music rests»23. Ptolemy, in 
fact, asserts:
This sort of power [i.e. the harmonic power which 
grasps the differences between sounds] employs as its 
instruments and servants the highest and most mar-
velous of the senses, sight and hearing, which, of all 
the senses, are most closely tied to the ruling principle, 
and which are the only senses that assess their objects 
not only by the standard of pleasure but also, much 
more importantly, by that of beauty. (Ptolemy, Harm. 
III, 3, 93.11-15; transl. Barker [1989]: 372)
If this human power to grasp sounds is so 
indissolubly linked with the beautiful, and both 
Augustine and Ptolemy had openly affirmed it, 
why, then, does Boethius not say the same thing 
in his quadrivial treatises? It is risky to speculate 
on an argument ex silentio, yet it is possible to 
propose an answer if we keep in mind what Aris-
totle asserts in Metaphysics, book 13, in the pas-
sage mentioned at the beginning of this paper: the 
good and the beautiful are different, for the for-
mer always implies conduct as its subject, while 
the beautiful is found also in motionless things. 
Boethius is clearly conscious of this difference. 
Music never lacks the “movement”. Beauty, there-
fore, is not involved in music itself as is the good, 
which is always implied by movement, specifically 
by that of human actions,actions. Beauty is some-
thing something to which music conducts only 
when the appropriate movement towards unity is 
realized, and the ethical scope is reached. This is, 
however, a condition which cannot be gained sta-
bly with musical practice and skill, in the same 
way in which, for instance, music can be fruit-
23 Barker [1989]: 271.
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fully employed for curing illness, for relaxing 
the body, for exciting the soul and for the other 
functions related to guide the human behavior 
and to correct the different kinds of human char-
acters. Boethius is clear in expressing this idea, 
and underlines that people have different reac-
tions to music according to their characters, ages, 
attitudes: people «who are rougher delight in the 
rather uncultivated modes», while people «who 
are more gentle delight in more moderate modes» 
(Inst. mus. I, 2: 180-182). In musical melodies, 
the response of pleasure is dependent upon the 
attitude of each human being. Therefore, musi-
cal pleasure is strictly connected to what is good, 
because music acts upon the character and men-
tal disposition. A moderate and “temperate” music 
corrects the lascivious dispositions or the excited 
characters, while the lascivious musical modes 
corrupt the good dispositions of character, and 
alter the right psychological and physical balance, 
so that what pleases is no more oriented to what is 
good (Inst. mus. I, 2: 184-187). For Boethius, how-
ever, it is not possible to associate in the same way 
what pleases in music with what is beautiful.
Yet, the complex relation of music to beauty 
has also a more hidden reason. Music is move-
ment, hence the convergence to unity is some-
thing that is never firmly realized, given that 
music is the movement of sounds, and sounds are 
movements themselves. There is, therefore, only 
one kind of music that realizes by itself the stabil-
ity of unity required to generate really “the beauti-
ful”. This is the music of the Platonic soul of the 
world. This is not a physical music, neither does 
it immediately refer to the music of the spheres, 
but is that overall perfect harmony of the animat-
ed principle that governs the world, as Boethius 
remarks in referring to the Timeus:
What Plato rightfully said can likewise be under-
stood: the soul of the universe was joined together 
according to musical concord. For when we hear what 
is properly and harmoniously united in sound in con-
junction with that which is harmoniously coupled 
and joined together within us and are attracted to it, 
then we recognize that we ourselves are put together 
in its likeness, for likeness attracts, whereas unlikeness 
disgusts and repels. (Inst. mus. I, 1, 179.20-180.10; 
transl. Bower-Palisca [1989]: 2)
The supreme harmony of the world soul is what 
makes the universe participate in beauty, which, in 
itself, is not in the physical world, but in the idea of 
the cosmos in God’s mind. Human reason is what 
can envisage true beauty, because reason is like a 
shadow of the divine mind. For Boethius, math-
ematical sciences are therefore the fundamental 
steps for disclosing beauty, which – in agreement 
with Aristotle – is «a cause» and is «in motion-
less things», and therefore – in agreement with 
the Christianized Platonism – it is in the Creator’s 
mind. This implicit conclusion is explained in the 
last work by Boethius, the Consolation of Philoso-
phy, written in about 523, while awaiting execution. 
The Consolation is an impressive dialogue between 
Boethius and Philosophy and portrays the progres-
sive rising of the human mind from complaint and 
misery to the understanding that providence orders 
all things for the best, human beings included. 
Despite appearances, Philosophy proclaims that 
changing fortune does not rule the world, and that 
the good is not oppressed24. After having realized 
that the true good is the very source of happiness, 
Boethius and Philosophy go through each of the 
supposed goods, which include fame, honor, wealth 
and also beauty. As proved for all these earthly 
goods, also the search for physical beauty and 
pleasure is an illusion, because beauty is quickly 
lost in bodies subject to illness and corruption. And 
even something which is not subject to change, 
such as a bright and colorful jewel that pleases for 
its radiance, does not possess the real beauty. A 
key-passage from book 3 of the Consolation reveals 
that the precious stone, as well as all other earth-
ly things, has nothing but a shadow of the higher 
beauty, the knowledge of which is reserved only for 
rational creatures:
I mean, what is there <in the jewel>, lacking the 
soul’s self-motion and indivisibility, that can rightly 
24 See, inter alia, Chadwick [1981]; Moreschini [2014]; 
Donato [2013].
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seem beautiful to a rational nature that has a soul? 
Even if, by their Creator’s efforts and by their own 
play of colors, they draw to themselves something of 
the Beautiful at the farthest removed, they are all the 
same placed far below your own superiority and are 
in no way deserving of your amazement. (Cons. Phil. 
II, 5, 8-10; transl. adapted from Relihan [2001]: 35)
The key concept that reveals the true nature of 
beauty is in the mention of self-motion and indi-
visibility as attributes pertaining to the soul alone, 
which has a greater dignity than non-living things. 
And, among living beings, only the rational soul 
has the superiority needed to grasp what is really 
beautiful; and only rational beings can be really 
beautiful. Human nature, however, is beautiful not 
for its bodily attractiveness, or for goods such as 
fame, or «popular honors», because they do not 
possess «the beauty that belongs to real rank» 
(Cons. Phil. III, 4, 8), as is made clear in the fol-
lowing passage:
Contemplate the vastness, the mightiness, and the 
swiftness of the heavens and now, at last, stop admir-
ing worthless things. And make no mistake: The heav-
ens are less to be admired for these things than for 
the reason by which they are governed. And the fair 
sheen of beauty – how fugitive it is, how swift, more 
fleeting than the ever-changing flowers of spring! 
For if, as Aristotle says, people had the eyes of Lyn-
ceus, so that their vision could penetrate any barri-
ers, wouldn’t the body of Alcibiades, proverbially so 
beautiful on its surface, seem utterly shameful after 
they had peered at the guts within? And so, it is not 
your nature that makes you seem beautiful, but only 
the weakness of the eyes of those who look upon you. 
(Cons. Phil. III, 8, 8-11, transl. adapted from Relihan 
[2001]: 65-66)
Beauty is a matter of reason alone. It is, in 
Boethius’ view, the very reason that governs all 
things, namely the divine reason. At the core 
of book 3, the celebrated hymn O qui perpetua, 
inspired from Plato’s Timaeus and from Proclus’ 
commentary on it and reminiscent of the ancient 
Neoplatonic hymns on cosmic theology, eventually 
addresses the beautiful to its proper subject, the 
world as a unity in the mind of the Creator, who 
is the supreme beauty:
You, who governs the world by everlasting reason 
(perpetua ratione) […] and, by resting unmoved, put 
all things in motion, no external causes demanded 
you to imitate the work (fingere opus) of the muta-
ble matter, but the form of the true good planted 
within you (insita), totally deprived of envy. You lead 
all things out from their supreme exemplar, you, the 
most beautiful, by carrying in your own mind the 
beautiful world (pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse mun-
dum mente gerens), and by forming it [the world] in 
conform likeness (similique in imagine formans), and 
also by commanding that perfect parts make it per-
fect, you tie (ligas) the elements with numbers … and 
making the soul, which moves all things, as mean of 
a threefold nature, you spread (resolvis) it in equal 
members (per consona membra). (Cons. Phil. III, 9, 
transl. adapted from Relihan [2001]: 71-72)
The Creator is perfect unity, stable immobil-
ity, and supreme reason. The perpetual posses-
sion of these three elements characterizes God 
as supreme beauty (pulcherrimus), to whom the 
form of the true good belongs. Hence, the world 
in God’s mind is beautiful (pulcher), because it is 
the supreme exemplar (the Platonic idea) of the 
physical world25. God is moved to create through 
his own goodness, and in so doing, he forms the 
cosmos as an image of the beautiful ideal, the lat-
ter being the immobile cause of motion of all 
movable things, and the perfect unity to which 
the physical plurality tends (Timaeus, 29e-30b). 
Finally, the hymn evokes the Platonic mathemat-
ics of the cosmos by asserting, still in line with 
the Timaeus, that God binds the world’s ele-
ments together through numbers, and by keeping 
the equilibrium, namely the perfect ratio, of the 
elemental qualities of cold and hot, dry and wet. 
So, he also gives a threefold structure to the soul 
of the world, set in the middle of the cosmos to 
move all things26. Notwithstanding its perfect 
mathematical structure, the physical world is not 
25 See Chadwick [1981]: 233-234.
26 Timaeus, 31b-37a; Laws 896e; Phaedrus 245c.
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called beautiful, as is the ideal world. For Boethi-
us, the passage to the physical plurality, material-
ity and movement implies the rupture of the per-
fect unity and stability that characterize the ideal 
world in the divine mind. The real cosmos cannot 
but evoke sparse and sporadic glimpses of such 
exemplar beauty, and these glimpses progressively 
extend and become more “visible” as the creatures 
grow in the scale of dignity, up to the rational 
beings, the closest to the divine rationality.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has evidenced the complexity of 
the Boethian notion of the good and the beauti-
ful in mathematics, which emerges from his extant 
works on arithmetic and music. Basing his rea-
soning on Nicomachus’s and Ptolemy’s attempts 
at reconciling Plato’s and Aristotle’s views, the 
Roman philosopher saw in the mathematical sci-
ences, i.e. the quadrivium, a path to philosophi-
cal wisdom, consisting in the passage from sensi-
ble knowledge to the highest achievements of the 
intellect, that is, the knowledge of what is true and 
stable. This passage is made possible thanks to the 
way in which mathematical sciences address the 
mind to the esse, namely the continuous and dis-
crete quantities, which are stable and unchanging, 
if they are mathematically thought of as separate 
from the sensible things, while they are subject 
to change in their physical pertaining to sensible 
things. We have seen that the possibility to grasp 
these quantities in their stable ratios is exactly 
what makes the human mind realize that unity is 
the perfect ratio and supreme stability to which all 
other ratios tend.
Thus, the ethical aim of mathematics is to 
indicate to the human mind how to correct the 
ratios in physical things, and particularly that of 
the balance of the body and the soul, so as to real-
ize the best relationship in movements and more 
precisely in the specific form of movement of the 
rational beings, that is in actions which direct us 
to unity and perfection. This is exemplified in On 
Arithmetics, in which Boethius represents specific 
mathematical ratios as the most perfect forms of 
government. Yet, the ethical scope of mathematics 
is elaborated more at length in On Music, by pre-
senting the ratios involved in musical consonances 
and harmonic patterns as having a specific effect 
in moving the human soul to emotions, actions, 
and to good or bad dispositions of the mind, 
namely to psychological and physical affections 
that music can both evoke and heal. Again, the 
therapy is the restoring of the perfect balance, the 
closest to unity.
More complex, on the other hand, is the 
Boethian relationship between mathematics and 
beauty. In clear antithesis to the position taken by 
Augustine on the beauty of the rhythmic patterns 
that better represent the beauty of unity, Boethius 
does not relate the mathematical ratios of the con-
sonances to an esthetical judgment by making use 
of the category of beauty. For him, the physical 
world is totally immersed in changes and move-
ments, and this cannot but impede things from 
expressing the stable unity, which is required for 
contemplating the beautiful. Music, in particu-
lar, is in itself movement, so that while it naturally 
expresses its ethical connection, which – as seen 
above – concerns human movements and actions, it 
cannot in the same way be linked to the beautiful.
Are there other mathematical sciences con-
nected to beauty? Perhaps geometry, being the 
discipline of the immobile magnitude, or astron-
omy, whose object of study is the perpetual cir-
cular motion that displays in time the stable 
mathematical structure of the soul of the world; 
but, unfortunately, the treatises by Boethius 
devoted to these disciplines have not reached us. 
What can be said with regard to the absence of 
the use of the category of beauty in music is that 
it strongly affected the early medieval theory of 
music, deeply inspired by Boethius27. An inspec-
27 On this dependance, Bower-Palisca [1989]: XIX-XX 
assert: «When a tradition of independent musical treatis-
es began in the ninth century, Boethius’s treatise became 
the unique source for the thorough mathematical under-
pinning of Western musical theory. It is ironic that this 
work intended as an approach to logic and philosophy 
would essentially shape the most illiberal of the liberal 
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tion in the corpus of writings on music theory 
collected in the remarkable website TML. The-
saurus Musicarum Latinarum makes it clear that, 
apart from Augustine, the words pulcher and pul-
chritudo and their declinations are absent from 
musical considerations up to the writings of the 
eleventh century, when the theory of music start-
ed to develop autonomously from the Boethian 
theory and terminology. Gradually during that 
century, we can notice the reintroduction of this 
“missing word” to indicate the musical aggregates 
that are more agreeable to the ears28. The musical 
beautiful has definitively moved from the heav-
ens to the earth.
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